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To achieve oﬀ-line delegation for mobile readers, we propose a delegation protocol for mobile RFID allowing its readers access
to speciﬁc tags through back-end server. That is to say, reader-tag mutual authentication can be performed without readers being
connected to back-end server. Readers are also allowed oﬀ-line access to tags’ data. Compared with other delegation protocols, our
scheme uniquely enables back-end server to limit each reader’s reading times during delegation. Even in a multireader situation,
our protocol can limit reading times and reading time periods for each of them and therefore makes back-end server’s delegation
moreﬂexible.Besides,ourprotocolcanpreventauthorizedreadersfromtransferringtheirauthoritytotheunauthorized,declining
invalid access to tags. Our scheme is proved viable and secure with GNY logic; it is against certain security threats, such as replay
attacks, denial of service (DoS) attacks, Man-in-the-Middle attacks, counterfeit tags, and breaches of location and data privacy.
Also, the performance analysis of our protocol proves that current tags can aﬀord the computation load required in this scheme.
1.Introduction
In recent years, Radio Frequency Identiﬁcation (RFID) has
been widely used in security control, process monitoring,
medical management and e-ticket, and so forth. The struc-
ture of RFID includes three parts: tag, reader, and back-end
database. Tags can be divided into two categories: active tags
and passive tags. An active tag is equipped with a battery
and therefore can power itself without the power from
readers’ radio. It can do more computation and has a wider
communicationrange,comparedwithpassivetags.However,
duetoitshighercostsandbatterylimits,itisnotsopopularly
used as a passive tag, which is not conﬁned by battery life
and less costs. Therefore, passive tags are commonly used in
RFID systems, despite its limited computation ability and
power source from reader sensing. Besides, a traditional
ﬁxed reader has a bigger antenna for tag sensing and wider
communication range but is not suitable for every occasion.
Hence, a mobile reader has been developed in recent
years to combine mobile technology with traditional RFID
systems, through the integration of reading chips, PDA, and
mobile devices, hence mobile RFID [1–4]. The mobile RFID
system that Lee and Kim [1] propose already sketches a
basic structure, whose communication steps are illustrated
in Figure 1.
Step 1. A mobile reader queries a tag and receives its
feedback.
Step 2. After the feedback, the mobile reader forwards it to
an authentication server (AS) to verify the tag’s identity.
Step 3. If the tag is veriﬁed, the AS will query an object
nameserver(ONS)aboutthetag’suniformresourcelocation
(URL).
Step 4. The ONS sends the tag’s URL to the AS.
Step 5. The AS requests an object information server (OIS)
for the tag’s information.
Step 6. The OIS sends the requested information to AS.
Step 7. The AS forwards the tag’s information to the mobile
reader.
Because a passive tag’s computation is quite limited [5–
8], attackers can easily access the tag. Once it is not able to
verify a reader’s identity, certain security issues rise, such as
replayattacks,Man-in-the-Middleattacks,distributeddenial
of service (DDoS) attacks, counterfeit tags, and bleaches of
privacy.2 EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking
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Figure 1: Structure of Mobile RFID.
Mobile RFID’s authentication requires that a reader
access a tag and verify the tag’s returned messages through
back-end server [9–11]. However, interruption of the
authentication happens due to unstable network connection
or moving of the reader. For this reason, oﬀ-line delegation
schemes [12–16] have been developed in recent years
allowing a reader partial authority, so that it can verify a
tag’s messages directly. Lee and Li [15] use a time stamp for
access control and multireading issue, and solve the problem
that a tag may be accessed by several delegated readers at the
same time. However, Lee’s scheme cannot limit each reader’s
reading times. Further, in this protocol, an authorized
reader may transfer the delegation authority to unauthorized
readers without permission, allowing unauthorized readers
to access the tag. Besides, malicious users can modify the
time stamp sent from a reader, so that the time stamp that
a tag receives is superior to the tag’s. Then the tag sends to
the reader a request for updating keys. Receiving the request,
the reader sends it back to back-end server to renew the tag’s
keys and to generate a new delegation table for the reader.
When receiving the new delegation table, the reader updates
its table and the tag’s information and sends the information
tothetag.Followingthese,thetagchecksthetimestampﬁrst
and therefore will not renew the key. As a result, authorized
readers are not able to access the tag.
I nF o u l a d g a r ’ sd e l e g a t i o np r o t o c o l[ 14], he adds random
numbers to messages and makes the attackers unable to
use the intercepted data to carry out replay attacks because
they do not have the required facilities to convert the data.
Neither can the attackers launch Man-in-the-Middle attacks
by generating any valid messages for tags or readers. Thus,
the system will not get paralyzed because of the asynchrony
between readers and tags. Besides, Fouladgar uses a counter
to limit a reader’s delegation and reading times. However,
w h e nar e a d e rs e n d saq u e r yt oat a g ,t h et a gd o e sn o t
verify the query. If attackers keep sending queries to a tag,
the tag’s counter increases, which unfortunately decreases
an authorized reader’s opportunities for delegation and
reading. When the counter reaches a limit, the reader can
no longer access the tag and renew its keys. Meanwhile, if a
legitimatetagrenewsitskeyatthismoment,eventheoriginal
reader is not able to access the tag. Hence, this protocol
does not apply to a multi-reader situation or to mobile
RFID networks. Since Dimitrou’s delegation protocol [16]i s
designated for mobile readers, it can be applied in a mobile
RFID environment. However, back-end server’s authority
delegation to readers is not automated and consequently
causes some troubles when the server tries to delegate several
readers at a time. Also, this scheme does not set any reading
limits for readers.
Delegation protocols mentioned above do not com-
pletely apply to mobile readers and fail to prevent read-
ers from transferring delegation messages to unauthorized
readers. Also, when delegating multireaders simultaneously,
these protocols have no control over each reading in spite
of the limitation of reading times. As a result, one reader
may read too many times and put other readers at a
disadvantage. To deal with authorized readers’ fair reading
and mobile readers’ authentication issues, we propose a
delegationprotocolthatcanbeappliedinamobileRFIDand
multi-reader environment, allowingmultireaders to perform
mutual authentication through back-end server and to get
access to speciﬁc tags. We limit each reader’s reading times
according to its authority and, further, restrict its reading
timeperiods(howlongitcanread).Whendelegationexpires
or authorized readers transfer delegation messages to the
unauthorized, readers’ access to a tag will be declined. More-
over, our protocol can secure against certain security threats,
such as replay attacks, DDoS attacks, Man-in-the-Middle
attacks, counterfeit tags, and breaches of location privacy.
Section 2 d e a l sw i t ho u ro ﬀ-line delegation protocol
and details how to delegate a reader group and to limit
each reader’s reading times. Section 3 presents the security
analysis of our protocol and compares it with that of other
related schemes. Conclusion is drawn in Section 4.
2.Delegation Protocol withLimitson
Reading Times
W h e nam o b i l er e a d e ri si na no ﬀ-line access situation, we
try to limit its reading times. Hence, we propose a protocol
that is capable of delegation and oﬀ-line authentication in
am o b i l eR F I Dn e t w o r k .A sFigure 2 illustrates, back-end
server delegates multireaders, and then the readers can read
thetagsevenwhentheyarenotconnectedtotheserver.Thus,
during the oﬀ-line access, readers do not need to connect
back-end server to identify the tags. They simply can achieve
mutual authentication with the tags in an oﬀ-line situation.EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking 3
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Figure 2: Delegation in a mobile environment.
Table 1: Access control list of TID2.
(a) Initial state of Rlist2
Null Null Null
(b) Rlist2 after readers’ reading
RID1 TC2
1 = 5 MaxTC2
1 = 10
RID11 TC2
11 = 15 MaxTC2
11 = 15
RID3 TC2
3 = 1 MaxTC2
3 = 10
In addition, in our protocol, one reader’s reading times of a
speciﬁc tag will not be inﬂuenced by other readers’ reading
of it.
As shown in Figure 2, because back-end server and
readers have better computation, communication between
the server and delegated readers RID1,RID2,...,RIDj can
be encrypted with AES [17] or 3-DES. For this reason,
we assume that the channel between back-end server and
readers is secured and use the channel for delegation, so as
to acquire a tag’s access and reading times. After delegation,
reader RID1 and tags TID1, TID2 are able to do oﬀ-line
authentication, and the reader can even access the tags’ data
through an insecure channel now, as shown in Figure 2(b).
Readers RID3 and RID11 also use this channel to access tags
TID2, TID3,a n dTID5.
Our protocol consists of three phases. Phase 1 is initial-
ization, that is, preliminary work for tags, readers, and back-
end server. Phase 2 deals with the body of our delegation
protocol, how back-end server delegates a group of readers.
Phase 3 is about oﬀ-line authentication, explaining how we
limit readers’ reading times in an oﬀ-line situation and how
we allow them oﬀ-line access to tags.
2.1. Phase 1. Initialization. In order for tags and readers
to recognize each other when doing oﬀ-line authentication
of tags, tags should be able to compute hash and generate
random numbers, and there must be enough storage for the
access control list (ACL) that has the access to the tag. In
addition, during initialization, each tag TIDi is supposed to
have its time stamp TSi to check if the delegated readers have
expired, whose initial state TSi = 0 indicates that all the
legitimately authorized readers can read the tag. Also, the tag
TIDi hastosharetwosecretkeyswiththeback-enddatabase.
Because the length of hash chains [18] can be unlimited, our
protocol does not take it into consideration that keys will
run out. Hence, after initialization, tags have an empty ACL
Rlisti, which stores the information including each reader’s
number, reading times, and the allowed maximum reading
times. For example, when an unauthorized reader tries to
access tag TID2, Rlist2 contains no information, as shown
in Table 1(a). However, when an authorized reader accesses
tag TID2, TID2 will put the reader’s information into Rlist2.
As Table 1(b) shows, when accessing tag TID2, the allowed
reading times for readers RID1, RID11,a n dRID3 are 10, 15
and 10 times, respectively. In Table 1(b), reader RID1 reads
tag TID2 ﬁrst. After RID1 reads the tag twice, TC2
1 = 2
and then RID11 reads TID2.T h u s ,i nTable 1,w ew i l ls e e
reader RID11 and its reading times TC2
11, and the allowed
maximum reading times MaxTC2
11 are all included in the
control list Rlist2.N e x t ,r e a d e rRID1 reads TID2 three times,
RID11 reads TID2 fourteen times, and RID3 reads TID2.T a g
TID2 then puts RID3’s information into Rlist2. At last, the
content of Rlist2 is shown in Table 1(b). We will detail how
ACL changes in Section 2.3.
To run our oﬀ-line authentication protocol, RIDj needs
to receive the delegation table (Table 2)ﬁ r s tf r o mb a c k -
end database. In the initial state, RIDj has not delegated4 EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking
Table 2: RID11’s delegation table.
Delegation table
TID2 RS2 = 1 RC2
11 = 0
SignRT2 = H(TKcur
2 ⊕TID2 ⊕RID11)
RK2
11 = Hn(TKcur
2 ⊕RID11) ⊕G(Hn(TKcur
2 ⊕RID11))
MaxRK2
11 = Hn(TKcur
2 ⊕RID11) ⊕Gp(Hn(TKcur
2 ⊕RID11))
TID3 RS3 = 1 RC3
11 = 0
SignRT3 = H(TKcur
3 ⊕TID3 ⊕RID11)
RK3
11 = Hn(TKcur
3 ⊕RID11) ⊕G(Hn(TKcur
3 ⊕RID11))
MaxRK3
11 = Hn(TKcur
3 ⊕RID11) ⊕Gp(Hn(TKcur
3 ⊕RID11))
TID5 RS5 = 1 RC5
11 = 0
SignRT5 = H(TKcur
5 ⊕TID5 ⊕RID11)
RK5
11 = Hn(TKcur
5 ⊕RID11) ⊕G(Hn(TKcur
5 ⊕RID11))
MaxRK5
11 = Hn(TKcur
5 ⊕RID11) ⊕Gp(Hn(TKcur
5 ⊕RID11))
Request table, RIDj
Database Reader RIDj
Delegation new table
Figure 3: The Process that readers obtain the delegation table from
back-end database.
the table by back-end database, so the table will be empty.
Also, readers send request to the back-end database for
authentication information that the delegation table needs.
Back-end database has tags’ identiﬁcation set T =
{(TIDi,TKcur
i ,TKnext
i ) | i = 1 ∼ x}, which includes tags’
numbers, current secret keys TKcur
i used to generate session
keys for readers to read tags, and next secret key for use
TKnext
i .W h e nt a g sr u no u to fk e y sTKcur
i , tags and back-end
database will adopt the autorenewal approach, proposed by
Zhang and Zhu [18] and then use as the next key TKnext
i
the new key that TKcur
i and TKnext
i generate. Meanwhile,
the old TKnext
i is treated as the current key TKcur
i .B a c k - e n d
database, on the other hand, needs to save the set of readers’
information R ={ (RIDj,RCi
j) | i = 1 ∼ x, j = 1 ∼ y}.T h e
counter RCi
j indicates the reading times that RIDj is allowed
(by back-end database) to read the tag TIDi.A sr e a d e r sh a v e
not read tags yet after initialization, thus RCi
j = 0. The next
section will deal with the protocol we propose that which
allows back-end database to delegate the access to readers,
so that readers are authorized to read and identify tags.
2.2. Phase 2. Delegation Protocol. In the mutual authentica-
tion protocol between tags and readers, we propose, they
need to authenticate each other without back-end database
and only the authorized readers can access the tag. For this
reason, we require that readers be delegated directly by back-
end database (Figure 3).
When RIDj fails to obtain the delegation table or the
table is invalid, the reader will send Request Table to back-
end database for it. Receiving the request, back-end database
Table 3: Notations.
TIDi Tag identity
RIDj Reader identity
TKcur
i TIDi’s session key in the current session
TKnext
i TIDi’s session key in the next session
TCi
j
Counter on tag’s part, counting RIDj’s queries to
TIDi
RCi
j
Counter on reader’s part, counting RIDj’s queries
to TIDi
MaxTCi
j RIDj’s maximum queries to TIDi
Rlisti
Access control list,
Rlisti ={ RIDj,TCi
j,MaxTC
i
j},u s e dt os t o r e
reader RIDj’s identity, reading times TCi
j, and the
maximum queries MaxTCi
j.
TSi TIDi’s time stamp
RKi
j Session key shared between TIDi and RIDj
H(), G() Hash functions
then gives the reader a time stamp RSi to access the tag
TIDi according to the reader’s reading authority. Further, it
uses the time stamp, tag’s secret key TKcur
i , and the reader’s
number RIDj to generate the session key RKi
j when the
reader accesses the tag, that is,
RKi
j = Hn−RSi+1

TKcur
i ⊕RIDj

⊕GP

Hn−RSi+1

TKcur
i ⊕RIDj

.
(1)
The formula RKi
j includes two parts Hn−RSi+1(TKcur
i ⊕
RIDj)a n dGP(Hn−RSi+1(TKcur
i ⊕ RIDj)) to prevent readers’
illegitimate alteration of the times of reading tags. Due to
the lack of tags’ key TKcur
i ,r e a d e r sa r eu n a b l et og e n e r a t e
the message Hn−RSi+1(TKcur
i ⊕RIDj) with the key TKcur
i and
time stamp RSi from back-end database. As in Figure 4,o u r
protocol will run the hash function H() n times along the
x-axis, generating n time stamps. Likewise, it will run the
hash function G() p times along the y-axis and come toEURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking 5
RSi = 1
Hn(TK
⊕
RIDj)
G()
G()
G(Hn(TK
⊕
RIDj))
GP(Hn(TK
⊕
RIDj))
D
i
r
e
c
t
i
o
n
o
f
r
e
a
d
i
n
g
t
i
m
e
s
Direction of time-stamps
H()
RSi = 1, the session
key in ﬁrst reading
Hn(TK
⊕
RIDj)
⊕
G(Hn(TKcur
i
⊕
RIDj))
RSi = 1, the session
key when RIDj reads
TIDi for P times
Hn(TK
⊕
RIDj)
⊕
GP(Hn(TK
⊕
RIDj))
RSi = n
H(TK
⊕
RIDj)
G()
G()
G(H(TK
⊕
RIDj))
GP(H(TK
⊕
RIDj))
H()
RSi = n, the session
key in ﬁrst reading
H(TK
⊕
RIDj)
⊕
G(H(TK
⊕
RIDj))
RSi = n, the session
key when RIDj reads
TIDi for P times
H(TK
⊕
RIDj)
⊕
GP(H(TK
⊕
RIDj))
TK
⊕
RIDj
cur
i
cur
i
cur
i
cur
i
cur
i
cur
i cur
i
cur
i
cur
i
cur
i
cur
i
cur
i
cur
i
cur
i
Figure 4: Stages of session key RKi
j.
Table 4: The change of Rlist2 and the corresponding responses of the reader in Step 3.
TID2 = 52, TKcur
2 = 4321, r1 = 558 RID11 = 11, r0 = 777, RK2
11, MaxRK2
11
TS2 Rlist2 : {RIDj, TC2
j, MaxTC
2
j} RS2 RC2
11
Situation 1 0 Rlist2 before Step 3 10
Null Null Null
Rlist2 after Step 3
RID11 TC2
11 = 0 MaxTC
2
11 = 15
Situation 2 1 Rlist2 before Step 3 15
RID11 TC2
11 = 4 MaxTC
2
11 = 15
Rlist2 after Step 3
RID11 TC2
11 = 5 MaxTC
2
11 = 15
Situation 3 1 Rlist2 before Step 3 10
RID1 TC2
1 = 5 MaxTC
2
1 = 10
Rlist2 after Step 3
RID1 TC2
1 = 5 MaxTC
2
1 = 10
RID11 TC2
11 = 0 MaxTC
2
11 = 15
the result GP(Hn−RSi+1(TKcur
i ⊕RIDj)). Further, we combine
the two parts and then ﬁnd the key MaxTCi
j when reader
RIDj reads the tag TIDi for the maximum times p.I n
Figure 4, when time stamp RSi = 1, back-end database uses
the hash functions H() and G() to obtain the session key
RKi
j = Hn(TKcur
i ⊕ RIDj) ⊕ G(Hn(TKcur
i ⊕ RIDj)) when
the reader reads the tag TIDi for the ﬁrst time. Besides, back-
end database, according to the maximum reading times p,
will also run the hash function G() p times to generate the
key MaxRKi
j = Hn(TKcur
i ⊕RIDj)⊕GP(Hn(TKcur
i ⊕RIDj))
when the reader reads the tag for the maximum times.
After generating the session key, back-end database
begins to create a delegation table for readers (Table 2).
This table includes reader RIDj,t a gTIDi, current system’s
time stamp RSi, reader’s reading times RCi
j, shared secret
SignRTi, the session key RKi
j used to read tags, and the key
MaxRKi
j for checking reader’s maximum reading times. In
the delegated information, SignRTi is a shared secret for
readers to indentify tag TIDi.I ti sc r e a t e db yt a g ’ sk e yTKcur
i ,
tag TIDi,a n dr e a d e rRIDj, that is, SignRTi = H(TKcur
i ⊕
TIDi⊕RIDj).Topreventauthorizedreadersfromdelegating
the others, we add in reader RIDj into SignRTi.
For instance, when receiving RID11’s Request Table
(Figure 2(a)), back-end database will create a delegation
table (Table 2) that can read TID2, TID3,a n dTID5. In the
delegation table, the two keys that reader RID11 reads ((1)
tagTID2’ssessionkeyRK2
11;(2)thekeyMaxRK2
11—checking
reader’s maximum reading times) are generated by back-
end database. In addition, back-end database uses current
time stamp RS2, tag’s secret key TKcur
2 ,a n dr e a d e rRID11 to
generate current time stamp’s session key. If RS2 = 1, then
RK2
11 = Hn(TKcur
2 ⊕RID11)⊕G(Hn(TKcur
2 ⊕RID11)). As for
MaxRK2
11,itisthekeythatRK2
11 isgoingtoreadatthe p time;
therefore, MaxRK2
11 = Hn(TKcur
2 ⊕RID11)⊕GP(Hn(TKcur
2 ⊕
RID11)). When the reader reads the tag the second time,6 EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking
Table 5: Comparison of authentication protocols.
Lee and
Li [15]
Fouladgar
and Aﬁﬁ
[14]
Dimitrou
[16]
Our
scheme
Prevention of replay
attack
      
Prevention of DDoS X     
Prevention of
Man-in-the-middle
attack
X     
Data privacy       
Location privacy       
Oﬀ-line
authentication
      
Mutual
authentication X     
Limitation of each
reader’s reading
times
XX X  
Prevention of
reader’s transfer of
delegation
XX X  
Compatibility with
mobile RFID XX  
the session key stored on the reader will then be updated as
RK2
11 = Hn(TKcur
2 ⊕RID11)⊕G2(Hn(TKcur
2 ⊕RID11)). TID3
and TID5 will generate session keys in the same way.
After receiving the delegation table from back-end
database, reader RID11 is able to read tags TID2, TID3,
and TID5 and then check the validity of the messages that
the tags return. Meanwhile, the reader’s time stamp that we
propose is delegated by back-end database, and TID2’s TS2
is therefore updated by the reader. Once the reader reads the
tag, its time stamp will synchronize with back-end database.
If the tag’s TS2 = 5, only when the reader’s RS2 = 5c a n
the reader read this tag; if one of the readers is in the state
that RS2 = 6, the tag will test the reader and update the
tag to TS2 = 6 (no matter whether the reading times reach
the maximum). RID11’s delegation table is then generated
according to the setting of back-end database, allowing the
readertoreadthetagincompliancewithits delegatedpower.
Thedetailedapproachandwhatinformationisusedbyback-
end database to control the reading times will be discussed
in Section 3. We use the notations summarized in Table 3 to
help illustrate the protocol throughout this paper.
2.3. Phase 3. Oﬀ-Line Mutual Authentication Protocol. After
acquiring the delegation table through the delegation proto-
col, readers are capable of oﬀ-line reading of tags and able
to limit the reading times in accordance with the delegation
table from back-end database. When reader RIDj tries to
read the tag TIDi that has been authorized access by back-
end database, mutual authentication (based on the protocol
of tag’s oﬀ-line authentication as shown in Figure 5)m u s tb e
done ﬁrst and then RIDj has to conﬁrm its reading times. If
the reading times are below back-end database’s limitation,
RIDj is allowed to read and identify the tag. The detailed
protocol and steps are as follows.
Step 1. When reading the tag, reader RIDj also sends out
Request,i t so w nI D( RIDj), and the random number r0 to
the tag. Receiving the Request message, tag TIDi uses its own
secret key TKcur
i , itself, and RIDj to generate the tag’s shared
secret SignRT
 
i = H(TKcur
i ⊕ TIDi ⊕ RIDj). Next, it creates
authentication information M
 
1 = G(SignRT
 
i  r0 r1)w i t h
SignRT
 
i as well as random numbers r0 and r1 using operator
“ ”toconcatenatethemasastring,sothatRIDj isabletouse
that information to identify the tag that it is reading. RIDj is
included in the secret key to keep the unauthorized readers
from acquiring SignRT
 
i and then reading the tag.
Step 2. After RIDj receives the tag’s information, it uses
TIDi’s shared secret SignRTi in the delegation table and
random numbers r0 and r1 of this session to create M1 and
then compares it with M
 
1 (sent by the tag) so as to check
the validity of tag TIDi. If the outcome of authentication
is positive, RIDj subsequently takes TIDi’s session key RKi
j
from the delegation table, RIDj’s current reading times RCi
j,
r0,a n dr1 to generate M
 
2 = G(RKi
j ⊕ RCi
j ⊕ r0 ⊕ r1), which
allows the tag to limit RIDj’s reading times. Further, it sends
to the tag M
 
2, RSi, RCi
j,a n dMaxR. If the tag fails to pass the
authentication, RIDj w i l lt a k er a n d o mn u m b e r sa ss e e d st o
generate false RSi, RCi
j, M
 
2,a n dMaxRand send them to the
tag in order to prevent from guessing attacks.
Step 3. According to the reader and time stamp, tag TIDi is
going to generate RKi
j when receiving the reader’s feedback.
With RKi
j, RCi
j, r0,a n dr1, TIDi creates M2 and then
compares it with M
 
2 that it has received. If RSi and RCi
j are
correct in M
 
2, RIDj is authenticated. Then, we will deal with
three situations in terms of time stamp.
First. If RIDj’s time stamp RSi is bigger than the tag’s time
stamp TSi and the received reading times RCi
j = 0,
it means the tag’s time has not synchronized with
the system, and reader RIDj has not read the tag
after receiving the new delegation table. Therefore,
tag TIDi needs to update its time stamp TSi to the
system’s time RSi and refresh its access control list
Rlisti.Furthermore,TIDi willsetRIDj’s counter TCi
j
as zero, calculate (according to MaxTCi
j t h a ti th a s
received)RIDj’smaximumreadingtimesMaxTCi
j =
P, and incorporate RIDj, TCi
j and MaxTCi
j into
Rlisti.
Second. When TIDi’s time synchronizes with the system
and the tag has been read, RIDj will be saved in
Rlisti. Then TIDi checks RIDj’s reading times. If
MaxTCi
j ≥ RCi
j, which means that the reading times
havenotreachedthemaximum,itwillcheckwhether
RCi
j synchronizes with TCi
j. If not, it means that the
tag did not receive the message for update in Step 4.
TIDi, therefore, synchronizes the counters RCi
j =
TCi
j.EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking 7
Table 6: Comparison of average computation of a reader and tag.
Reader Tag
Fouladgar and Aﬁﬁ [14] ((1+RL)/2)TH TH
Lee and Li [15] The same time
stamp (((1+RL)/2) ∗c +1 )TH
The same time
stamp 2TH
Diﬀerent time stamp ((1+RL)/2)TH Diﬀerent time stamp 3(RS −TS)TH
Dimitrou [16] ((1+RL)/2)TH TH
Our scheme ((11+RL)/2)TH ((16+n+P)/2)TH
Reader Tag
TIDi, TK , TSi
Rlisti = {RIDj, TCi
j, MaxTCi
j}
Generate r0 Generate r1
SignRT
i = H(TK
⊕
TIDi
⊕
RIDj)
M
1, r1
M
2, RSi,
RCi
j, MaxR
M
3, TCi
j, URK
M
4, URC
RIDj, RKi
j, MaxRKi
j,
TIDi, RCi
j, RSi, SignRTi
Request, RIDj, r0
cur
i
cur
i
cur
i
cur
i
If (M1 = M
1){
M
2 = G(RKi
j
⊕
RCi
j
⊕
r0
⊕
r1)
MaxR = G(MaxRKi
j
⊕
r0
⊕
r1)
}Else{
Generate rRS, rRC, rRK, rMaxRK
RSi = rRS, RCi
j = rRC
M
2 = G(rRK
⊕
rRC
⊕
r0
⊕
r1)
MaxR = G(rMaxRK
⊕
r0
⊕
r1)}
M
1 = G(SignRT
i ∥r0∥r1)
ﬂag = true
M2 = G(RKi
j
⊕
RCi
j
⊕
r0
⊕
r1)
If (M2 = M
2){
If ((RSi > TSi) ∧(RCi
j = 0)){
}Else if ((RSi = TSi) ∧(RIDj ∈ Rlisti) ∧(MaxTCi
j ≥ RCi
j)){
If (RCi
j > TCi
j){TCi
j = RCi
j}
}Else if ((RSi = TSi) ∧(RIDj / ∈ Rlisti) ∧(RCi
j = 0)){
Rlisti = Rlisti + {RIDj,0,P}
}Else {ﬂag = false}
}Else {ﬂag = false}
TSi = RSi, Rlisti = φ, Rlisti = Rlisti + {RIDj,0,P},TK = H(TK )
M3 = G(RKi
j
⊕
URK)
If ((RCi
j = TCi
j) ∧(M3 = M
3)){
RKi
j = RKi
j
⊕
URK
⊕
r0
⊕
r1
M
4 = G(RKi
j
⊕
RCi
j
⊕
r0
⊕
r1)
URC = G(RCi
j
⊕
r0
⊕
r1)
}Else{
Generate rRK,rRC
M
4 = G(rRK
⊕
rRC
⊕
r0
⊕
r1)
URC = G(rRC
⊕
r0
⊕
r1)}
Update RCi
j = TCi
j +1
If (ﬂag = true){
⊕
G
TCi
j+1(Hn−RSi+1(TKi
⊕
RIDj))
⊕
r0
⊕
r1)
URK = G
TCi
j(Hn−RSi+1(TKi
⊕
RIDj))
⊕
G
TCi
j+1(Hn−RSi+1(TKi
⊕
RIDj))
⊕
r0
⊕
r1
}Else{ Generate rTC,rRK,rURK
TCi
j = rTC,M
3 = G(rRK
⊕
r0
⊕
r1)
URK = G(rURK
⊕
r0
⊕
r1)}
M
3 = G(Hn−RSi+1(TKi
⊕
RIDj)
If ((TCi
j = RCi
j −1) ∧(M4 = M
4)){Update TCi
j = RCi
j}
M1 = G(SignRTi ∥r0∥r1)
G(RKi
j M4 =
⊕⊕
r0
⊕
r1) RCi
j
Figure 5: Oﬀ-line mutual authentication protocol.8 EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking
Table 7
Initial steps
Tag i Reader j Database
T   TIDi
T   TKcur
i
T   TKnext
i
T   TSi
T   r1
T|≡ #(r1)
R   RIDj
R   r0
R|≡ #(r0)
DB|≡ DB
TIDi ← −− → T
DB|≡ DB
TKcur
i ← −−→ T
DB|≡ DB
TKnext
i ← −−− → T
DB|≡ DB
RIDj
← −− → R
Table 8
Goal
R|≡ T
SignRTi ← −−−→ R
T|≡ R
RKi
j
← − → T
T|≡ DB
P
← → T
R|≡ #(RCi
j)
R|≡ #(RKi
j)
T|≡ φ(RKi
j)
T|≡ #(TCi
j)
The reader authenticates the tag with
SignRTi, whereas the tag authenticates
the reader with RKi
j,h e n c em u t u a l
authentication. Then, the tag acquires
the reader’s maximum reading times
P. Since the authentication is
conﬁrmed, the update of RKi
j, RCi
j,
and TCi
j will therefore be carried out.
Third. If TIDi’s time is synchronized with the system and
RIDj has not read TIDi yet, Rlisti does not contain
RIDj’s information, and the received RCi
j must be
zero. If all the conditions above are met, TIDi will
put into Rlisti the information that records RIDj.
After checking the messages (sent by RIDj), if the
result is positive, tag TIDi will use its saved hash value
GTCi
j(H(TKcur
i ⊕RIDj)) in the last session, secret key TKcur
i ,
and reader RIDj to generate the following message:
M 
3 = G

Hn−RSi+1
TKcur
i ⊕RID11

⊕GTCi
j+1

Hn−RSi+1
TKcur
i ⊕RID11

⊕r0 ⊕ r1

.
(2)
M
 
3 is used by RIDj for authentication and to update its
counter RCi
j. Meanwhile, in order for RIDj to check the
validity of M
 
3 and update RKi
j, TIDi also generates the
message
URK = GTCi
j

Hn−RSi+1
TKcur
i ⊕RID11

⊕GTCi
j+1

Hn−RSi+1
TKcur
i ⊕RID11

,
(3)
sending M
 
3, TCi
j,a n dURK to RIDj and updating RKi
j and
RCi
j. If the result of authentication is negative, tag TIDi will
use random numbers to generate false M
 
3, TCi
j,a n dURK,
preventing from guessing attacks. We store the value of G()
of last session in advance, so that the tag only needs to run
the hash function G one time.
Step 4. Reader RIDj judges by the equivalence between RCi
j
and TCi
j whether TCi
j has been modiﬁed and generates M3
with RKi
j and URK. It then checks if M3 equals M
 
3 so as
to conﬁrm the validity of M3. If the result is positive, it
will update RCi
j and RKi
j: RCi
j = TCi
j +1 .RKi
j = RKi
j ⊕
URK ⊕ r0 ⊕ r1. After the update, RIDj uses new RKi
j, RCi
j,
r0,a n dr1 to generate M
 
4 = G(RKi
j ⊕ RCi
j ⊕ r0 ⊕ r1)a n d
URC = G(RCi
j ⊕ r0 ⊕ r1), so that the tag can know that the
reader has updated the key and counter. Receiving M
 
4 and
URC from RIDj, the tag then updates its counter TCi
j.I f
the result of authentication is negative, RIDj will generate
random numbers to create M
 
4 and URC to prevent guessing
attacks.
Step 5. Receiving the message in Step 4, RIDj gets RCi
j with
received URC, checking if TCi
j is equivalent to −RCi
j − 1,
generating M4 with RKi
j, RCi
j, r0,a n dr1, ﬁnally checking
again if M4 equals M
 
4. If all the conditions above are met,
it means that reader RIDj’s update is successful and the tag’s
counter will be TCi
j = RCi
j.
For example, when receiving the delegation table from
back-end database, reader RID11 will send to the tag Request,
the reader RID11 = 11, and the random number of this
session r0 = 777. As the tag receives all the information, it
ﬁrst generates a random number r1 = 558 and then takes
its secret key TKcur
2 = 4321, its own ID TID2 = 52, and
the received RID11 to generate the shared secret SignRT
 
2 =
H(4321 ⊕ 52 ⊕ 11). Following this, the tag uses the shared
secret and the two random numbers 777 and 558 to generate
M
 
1 = G(SignRT
 
2 777 558) and subsequently returns M
 
1
and r1 to RID11.
Step 2. RID11 adopts the two random numbers 777 and 558
and the shared secret SignRT2 from the delegation table to
generate M1 = G(SignRT2 777 558) and then compares it
with M
 
1 to check its validity. If the result is positive, RID11
can therefore conﬁrm that the tag is TID2. Also, the reader
will take from the delegation table TID2’s corresponding
counter RC2
11, session key RK2
11, and the key MaxRK2
11 to
generate M
 
2 = G(RK2
11 ⊕ RC2
11 ⊕ 777 ⊕ 558) and MaxR =
G(MaxRK2
11 ⊕ 777 ⊕ 558). Moreover, it will send to the
tag the time stamp RS2 = 1, M
 
2, MaxR,a n dRC2
11. If the
authentication of the received M
 
1 fails, RID11 will generate
RS2, M
 
2, MaxR,a n dRC2
11 with random numbers and send
all of them to the tag.
Step 3. RID11 takes RS2 and RC2
11 to check the validity
of M
 
2. If the outcome is positive, we will deal with the
following three situations according to the tag’s time stamp
and ACL. Table 3 indicates the change of the tag’s Rlist2 and
the corresponding responses of the reader and the tag.
Situation 1. If received RS2 = 1 and bigger than the tag’s
TS2 = 0a n dRC2
11 = 0, the tag’s time stamp is no
longer valid and needs to synchronize with the system. Thus,
TS2 = RS2, and the tag will clear Rlist2 because the readerEURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking 9
Table 9
Delegation
Message
DB ∗(Request,RIDj)
R ∗(RSi,RCi
j,SignRTi,RKi
j,MaxRKi
j)
DB   RSi
DB   RCi
j
DB   SignRTi
DB   RKi
j
DB   MaxRKi
j
DB|≡ DB
RSi ← − → R
DB|≡ DB
RCi
j
← − → R
DB|≡ DB
SignRTi ← −−−→ R
DB|≡ DB
RKi
j
← − → R
DB|≡ DB
MaxRKi
j
←−−−→ R
R|≡ φ(RSi,RCi
j,SignRTi,RKi
j,MaxRKi
j)
R   RSi
R   RCi
j
R   SignRTi
R   RKi
j
R   MaxRKi
j
After receiving a reader’s Request and its ID RIDj, back-end database
will generate the information for the reader to access the tag. This
part is done through a secured channel, so this information can be
transferred directly to the reader, and the reader will take it without
further checking, hence RSi, RCi
j, SignRTi, RKi
j,a n dMaxRKi
j in the
reader.
may be inﬂuenced by time. It then puts into Rlist2 reader
RID11,c o u n t e rRC2
11 = 0, and the maximum reading times
MaxTC2
11 = 15.
Situation 2. If received RS2 = 1( e q u a lt oTS2 = 1), reader
RID11 is stored in Rlist2,a n dMaxTC2
11 = 15 (bigger than
RC2
11), RID11 is still entitled to access the tag. If the value of
reader’s counter is bigger than that of tag’s counter, the tag
did not receive the update message that the reader sent last
time, hence the update of the counter TC2
11.
Situation 3. If RS2 = 1e q u a l sTS2 = 1, RID11 is not in Rlist2
and RC2
11 = 0, RID11 has not read the tag TID2, hence the
incorporation of RC2
11 = 0a n dMaxTC2
11 = 15 into Rlist2.
Besides, according to the results above, whether tag TID2
is going to send messages depends on the validity of received
messages. If the validity is conﬁrmed, TID2 will generate
legitimate M
 
3,a n dURK to update the session key and the
reader’s counter. If not, it will generate TC2
11, M
 
3,a n dURK
with random numbers.
Step 4. The reader will check if TC2
11 is the same as RC2
11 and
then take RK2
11, URK and random numbers 777 and 558 to
generate M3 so as to check the validity of M
 
3. If the result is
positive, it will update the session key RK2
11 and its counter
RC2
11. It will subsequently generate M
 
4,a n dURC so that the
tag can update its counter simultaneously.
Step 5. If the received value of RC2
11 is one more than that
of TC2
11 and M
 
4 is conﬁrmed as valid, TC2
11 will then be
updated.
3.SecurityAnalysis
This section deals with the security analysis of our protocol,
especially in terms of oﬀ-line authentication in the preven-
tion of replay attack, DDoS, Man-in-the-Middle attack as
well as counterfeit tag, and the protection of tag owner’s data
and location privacy.
3.1. Prevention of Replay Attack. In replay attacks, attackers
usually acquire valid messages in the communications and
then resend those messages to tags or readers. Nonetheless,
due to the random numbers r0 and r1 in every session in
ourprotocol,whicheverymessageadoptsineverysession,all
the messages are therefore ever changing. Hence, attacks will10 EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking
Table 10
Oﬀ-line authentication of tag
Message
T ∗(Request,RIDj,r0)
T   r0
T   RIDj
After receiving RIDj and r0, the tag can identify this reader and know the random
numbers in this session.
R ∗(M
 
1,r1)
R   r1
R   (G(SignRTi ⊕r0 ⊕r1))
R   SignRTi
R|≡ #(G(SignRTi ⊕r0 ⊕r1))
R|≡ φ(G(SignRTi ⊕r0 ⊕r1))
R|≡ T
SignRTi ← −−−→ R
The reader can identify the tag because of SignRTi from back-end database. Since
both the reader and tag have SignRTi, the reader can then check the validity of
message M
 
1 and trust the received messages.
T ∗(M
 
2,RSi,RCi
j,MaxR)
T   RSi
T   RCi
j
T   (G(RKi
j ⊕RCi
j ⊕r0 ⊕r1)
T   RKi
j
T|≡ #(G(RKi
j ⊕RCi
j ⊕r0 ⊕r1))
T|≡ φ(G(RKi
j ⊕RCi
j ⊕r0 ⊕r1))
T|≡ R
RKi
j
← − → T
T   (G(MaxRKi
j ⊕r0 ⊕r1))
T   MaxRKi
j
T|≡ #(G(MaxRKi
j ⊕r0 ⊕r1))
T|≡ φ(G(MaxRKi
j ⊕r0 ⊕r1))
T|≡ P
T|≡ DB
P
← → T
Since the tag has been authenticated by the reader, it will generate RKi
j with received
RSi and RCi
j, authenticate M
 
2 with RKi
j, and then allow itself to authenticate the
reader. Besides, it will acquire with MaxR the maximum reading times P from
back-end database.
R ∗(M
 
3,TCi
j,URK)
R   TCi
j
R   (G(RKi
j ⊕URK))
R   URK
R|≡ #(G(RKi
j ⊕URK)
R|≡ φ(G(RKi
j ⊕URK))
R|≡ #(RKi
j)
R|≡ #(RCi
j)
After identifying the tag, the reader generates a new RKi
j and authenticates M
 
3.
Hence, R|≡ φ(G(RKi
j ⊕URK)).
If the authentication is successful, the reader’s RKi
j and RCi
j will be updated.
T ∗(M
 
4,URC)
T   TCi
j
T|≡ #(RCi
j)
T|≡ φ(RCi
j)
T|≡ #(RKi
j)
T|≡ #(G(RKi
j ⊕RCi
j ⊕r0 ⊕r1))
T|≡ φ(G(RKi
j ⊕RCi
j ⊕r0 ⊕r1))
T|≡ φ(RKi
j)
T|≡ #(TCi
j)
T|≡ R
RCi
j
← − → T
The tag receives a new RCi
j from URC, authenticates it, and generates a new RKi
j
with it. Next, the tag authenticates M
 
4 with the new RKi
j. If the result is positive,
T|≡ φ(G(RKi
j ⊕RCi
j ⊕r0 ⊕r1)) and TCi
j will be updated. Thus, TCi
j = RCi
j.EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking 11
fail to resend any messages when users are oﬀ line, despite
their successful interception. Even though the message in
Step 1 is intercepted and resent, attackers will obtain no valid
information from it. The tag’s returned message M
 
1 contains
random numbers r0 and r1, and attackers do not have the
valid shared secret, so we can say that replay attacks do not
post any threats in this step.
3.2. Prevention of DDoS. In our protocol, because the reader
does not need to update its session keys via back-end
database, failed reading due to unsuccessful update of keys
does not exist. Besides, if the tag does not receive the message
to update its counter in Step 4, it will synchronize its counter
in Step 3 in the next session when read by the same reader
for authentication. Thus, the reader is still able to recognize
the message it has sent in spite of the asynchronous counters.
Failed reading is avoided again.
3.3. Prevention of Man-in-the-Middle Attack. Man-in-the-
middleattacksalterorresendthemessagethatthetagreturns
or the reader sends when trying to pretend as valid tags or
readers. Our protocol uses M
 
1, M
 
2, M
 
3,a n dM
 
4 to check
the alteration of messages and to identify resent messages
with random numbers so as to prevent Man-in-the-middle
attacks. When these attacks try to pretend as valid readers or
tags,theyareunabletofakevalidmessagesforauthentication
and then fail.
3.4. Constrained Delegation. I no u rp r o t o c o l ,ar e a d e rc a n
authenticate a tag with a shared secret SignRTi and, on
the other hand, a tag can check the validity of a reader
with the message M
 
2 sent by a reader in Step 2,h e n c e
mutual authentication. Since the delegation table that a
reader receives contains the reader’s identity, the authorized
reader cannot delegate other readers. Even though acquiring
theinformation,theywillnotpassthemutualauthentication
scheme.
3.5. Protection of Location Privacy. Due to the random
numbers in all the messages between a tag and a reader in
every session and the protection of the messages by their
secret keys, hackers are unable to identify a tag’s number
despite their successful interception of the messages in our
protocol. In addition, attacks are unable to decide whether
two messages are sent by the same tag, for they do not have a
clue about the relation between the two messages sent by one
tag in diﬀerent sessions. Thus, attackers cannot locate the tag
from the messages they intercept.
3.6. Privacy of Data. As attacks, such as replay attack and
Man-in-the-Middle attack, cannot pass our authentication,
they are not able to access the tag without the authorization
from back-end database. The privacy of data is therefore
secured.
3.7. Limitation of Reading Times. In our protocol, each tag
has a counter TCi
j f o re a c hr e a d e ra n dac o u n t e rMaxTCi
j
for the maximum reading times. Besides, reader RIDj has
ak e yRKi
j and a counter RCi
j. When reader RIDj accesses
tag TIDi, the tag will check if the reader’s reading times RCi
j
is bigger than MaxTCi
j. Without the tag’s secret key TKcur
i ,
RIDj is unable to change the reading times and create a valid
sessionkey RKi
j.Therefore,neither canituseRKi
j andTCi
j to
generate a valid RCi
j, while RKi
j, RCi
j,a n dTCi
j are values set
for a pair of tag and reader. As a result, when RIDj accesses
TIDi, the reading times of the rest of readers will not be
inﬂuenced in the same environment.
3.8.ComparisonwithOtherRelevantAuthenticationApproac-
hes. After analyzing the security issues discussed above, we
thencompareourprotocolwithotheroﬀ-lineauthentication
approachesdesignedinrecentyears.AsshowninTable 4,our
protocol is able to prevent more attacks than others.
In Table 4, we ﬁnd the approaches [14–16]a r en o ta b l e
to work in a multi-reader or mobile RFID environment
or to limit each reader’s reading times, despite their oﬀ-
line authentication designs. Lee’s protocol [15]c a np r e v e n t
replay attacks, but not Man-in-the-Middle attacks and
DDoS caused by Man-in-the-Middle attacks. Its tags cannot
identify readers either. Our protocol, however, can meet all
these requirements and is compatible with the environments
mentioned above.
3.9. Performance. In Table 5, we analyze the computation of
our protocol and compare it with that of other protocols. We
onlyanalyzethehigh-complexitycomputingfunctionsinthe
table. RL represents the number of delegated tags in a reader;
TL represents the number of authorized readers in a tag; c
represents a reader’s reading times; TH represents the time to
run a hash.
In Lee’s protocol [15], if the reader’s time stamp is diﬀer-
ent from the tag’s and the tag has not been read for a while,
the tag’s computation will increase remarkably for the gap of
time between TS and RS, whereas the computation in our
protocol will not increase for the factor of time. Moreover,
Fouladgar and Aﬁﬁ [14]a n dD i m i t r o u[ 16] though need
only one hash computation, They are consequently not able
to make mutual authentication between a reader and tag.
They cannot even tell which reader is accessing the tag or
prevent the authorized reader from delegating other readers.
Our tag needs two encryption, and therefore the required
gate counts are fewer than 4000 [19], still within EPC Class
1 Gen2’s permitted range 5000 [20]. Besides, the value of n
is usually rather low, say 10 or 20, and it makes our protocol
viable even on a low cost RFID tag.
3.10. Proof of Security. H e r e ,w eu s eG N Yl o g i c[ 21]t o
prove our protocol. As back-end database and a reader
are communicating through a secured channel, we only
discuss the delegation messages exchanged between back-
end database and a reader and the information that back-
end database delegates to a reader. Further, in the protocol of
oﬀ-line authentication of tags, we analyze, step by step, the
messages in each session and their shared information.12 EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking
Our protocol sends the delegation message from back-
enddatabasetothereaderﬁrst,sothatthereadercandirectly
access the tag. Therefore, when the reader updates RCi
j and
RKi
j, back-end database will not be involved. In order to
limit the reader’s reading times, we acquire it from P in
T   MaxRKi
j. Also, RCi
j and TCi
j can be updated after the
mutual authentication between the reader and tag.
4. Conclusion
With the rapid development of technology and RFID
techniques, ﬁxed readers have been turned into mobile
ones. Through the combination of reading chips and mobile
devices (e.g., PDA and cell phones), people have constructed
a mobile RFID environment. However, as the communica-
tion of RFID is via radio wave and the readers of mobile
RFID are portable, readers are no longer conﬁned by space,
and therefore attacks are more easily to carry out. Besides,
mostcurrentRFIDauthenticationprotocolsneedtoexamine
the messages and require that the reader connect back-end
database for mutual authentication between the reader and
tag. Such approaches will be conﬁned by the accessibility
of wireless networks. Therefore, we propose a delegation
protocol for mobile RFID networks. It allows the reader to
do oﬀ-line mutual authentication and then access the tag.
In addition, the oﬀ-line delegation protocol that we propose
is able to limit each reader’s reading time and times when
multi-readersaredelegatedtoaccessthesametag.Thus,after
the delegation from back-end database, each reader’s reading
timeandtimescanbelimitedaccordingtoitstimestampand
counter. Moreover, we use GNY to prove that our protocol
is able to prevent the authorized readers from delegating
unauthorized ones. Therefore, our protocol is capable of the
prevention of attacks such as replay attack, DDoS, Man-in-
the-Middle attack, and counterfeit tag, and of the protection
of data privacy and location privacy. Last but not least, our
protocol applies in EPC Class Gen2.
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